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‘Tis better to choose and lose than to never choose at all
Nathaniel J. S. Ashby∗† Tim Rakow‡ Eldad Yechiam†
Abstract
When decisions involve opting in or out of competition many decision makers will opt-in even when doing so leads to losses
on average. In the current paper, we examine the generality of this effect in risky choices not involving competition. We found
that re-framing a sure (certain) zero option as an option to observe the results of the other options without choosing would lead
to increased consequential choice (i.e., increased selection of risky options rather than the zero option). Specifically, in two
studies we compared the rate of consequential choice in a novel paradigm where decision makers decide to observe or to choose
with consequence from a set of risky options (decisions-to-engage) to a full-feedback decisions-from-feedback paradigmwhere
the choice set included a labeled sure zero option. Compared to decisions-from-feedback, participants were more likely to
choose frommixed (risky) gambles with consequence (over a zero outcome) in decisions-to-engage. This occurred irrespective
of whether doing so was advantageous (i.e., when choice led to monetary gains on average) or disadvantageous (i.e., when
choice led to monetary losses on average), and when descriptions of the options outcomes and probabilities were provided
(Study 2). These findings provide an important boundary condition for the positive effects of experience on the quality of
choice, and suggest that decision makers’ preference for agency can sometimes induce poorer choices.
Keywords: loss aversion, loss avoidance, decisions-from-experience, decision making, decision strategy, agency.
1 Introduction
Recent work suggests that increased experience with a pair
of options (i.e., making choices and receiving outcome feed-
back) increases the rate of selecting options that return higher
average rewards in risky choice, that is, choices that maxi-
mize expected value (EV: Ashby & Gonzalez, 2017; Kon-
stantinidis, Ashby & Gonzalez, 2015; Yechiam&Hochman,
2013). This increased maximization with increasing expe-
rience is observed both when options provide net gains or
losses on average (Ashby & Rakow, 2016, 2017), and, under
some conditions, such experiential choice has been found
to outperform choice based on a description of probabilities
and outcomes (Jessup, Bishara & Busemeyer, 2008).1 In
addition, most participants appear to employ strategies that
maximize EV, and in addition endorse strategies aimed at
EV maximization (Ashby, Konstatinous & Yechiam, 2017),
although, in some situations, participants use strategies that
maximize value in the short run (Wulff, Hills & Hertwig,
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1In some contexts, such as when outcomes occur with low probabilities,
patterns of choice consistent with EV maximization are greatly diminished
(e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003).
2015). Furthermore, experience appears to reduce biases
that can lead to divergence from EV maximization such as
loss aversion and avoidance (e.g., Erev, Ert & Roth, 2010;
Erev, Gilat-Yihyie, Marchiori & Sonsino, 2015; Erev, Ert &
Yechiam, 2008; Yechiam & Hochman, 2013; but see, Ab-
dellaoui, L’Haridon & Paraschiv, 2011; Glöckner, Hilbig,
Henniger & Fiedler, 2016, for negative results).
Most studies involving decisions-from-experience have
employed paradigms like decisions-from-feedback (Barron
& Erev, 2003) or decisions-from-samples (Hertwig, Barron,
Erev & Weber, 2004). In decisions-from-feedback (also
referred to as the clicking paradigm), decision makers are
forced to make repeated choices between options with un-
known outcomes and probabilities; thus, decision makers
learn about the outcomes and their probabilities only by
making consequential choices. In decisions-from-samples
(also referred to as the sampling paradigm), decision makers
sample (simulate playing options at no monetary cost) from
available options before making one forced consequential
choice. As noted, in both tasks decision makers are forced
to make a choice between the options presented to them (as,
indeed, is the case in most laboratory experiments on de-
cision making). However, many everyday choices are part
of an inter-connected chain of decisions, in which a choice
between options is predicated on a prior decision of whether
or not to pick one of the available options. For example, we
must decide if we want to invest in the stock market, play the
lottery, attend an academic conference, buy a home, or go
on a vacation before we ever consider which stock, lottery-
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game, talk, home, or vacation destination we prefer.2 Thus,
the studies that have found that experience frequently leads
to increases in EVmaximization have not captured what may
be an important nuance of many, if not most, decisions made
outside the lab (for an exception, see Erev et al., 2010).
In the current study, we examine the effect of how the
decision is presented by including or excluding the dilemma
of whether to choose or not. (For a similar design involving
insurance purchases see Szrek & Baron, 2007.) Specifically,
we contrast a condition framed as a forced choice between
options (one of which is known to always pay zero), with
a condition in which the sure zero option is framed as an
opportunity to opt out of the choice by taking a passive
observational role. In both conditions, participants learn
the final outcome of all options. One domain where such a
framing difference is expected to have an effect is in decisions
where all options return net losses on average. For example,
participants in Erev et al. (2010) decided whether to play
a competitive game with another player. They reported a
strong tendency to play the game even if it involved large
losses and smaller gains. One explanation for this oddity
is that it reflects a general tendency to take risks (for small
amounts of money) in repeated choices independently of
the framing of the decision. Another explanation is that
participants derived some value from competition (Franken
& Brown, 1995).
To clarify this potential impact of decision framing we
examine situations where one can “exclude” oneself from
playing by deciding to observe without consequence (e.g.,
in order to gather information) and where no direct competi-
tion is involved (i.e., “games against nature”).3 In Study 1we
examined whether re-framing an option paying 0 with cer-
tainty (as in a standard decision-from-feedback task) as an
“observe” option (our decisions-to-engage task) increases
the selection of (other) available options, including those
producing losses on average. Study 2 replicates and extends
Study 1 by including descriptions of the options outcomes
and probabilities and including a greater variety of choice
sets. Our hypothesis is that, when given the option of opting
in or out of consequential choice, decision makers will be
more likely to choose from options with consequences rather
than receiving nothing with certainty. Thus, we test whether
decision makers are less likely to choose a sure zero option
when it is framed as not acting (i.e., observing).
2And indeed, the decision to choose is itself usually predicated on pre-
vious decisions. For example, the decision to invest follows a decision to
save which in turn follows a decision to earn money which was preceded
by a decision to go to college and so on. Our focus in this paper is a pair of
decisions from such chains: the decision to opt in our out of a given choice,
and the (possible) subsequent choice from a well-defined set of options.
3However, participants may have felt as though they were in a compe-
tition with the researcher conducting the study (i.e., trying to win as much
money from the researcher as possible).
2 General Method
Both studies employed two paradigms: (1) a novel task
combining the decisions-from-feedback (Barron & Erev,
2003) and decisions-from-samples (Hertwig et al., 2004)
paradigms that we call the decision-to-engage paradigm; and
(2) a version of the decisions-from-feedback paradigm (Bar-
ron&Erev, 2003). In each study, participants were randomly
assigned to one of these two paradigms (conditions).
In the decisions-to-engage condition, participants were
informed that they would face several tasks in which they
would make 100 decisions between alphabetically-labeled
options (e.g., “Option A”, “Option B”, shown in Figure 1).
Table 1 shows the sets of options in each study. In addition,
they were informed that they could instead choose to observe
by pressing an option labeled “observe”. When participants
opted to observe (i.e., clicked the observe button) they were
shown the outcomes that occurred for all available options
(i.e., what they would have won or lost had they chosen with
consequence). If they choose with consequence they saw the
outcome that occurred for the option they selected, as well as
what they would have won or lost had they instead selected
the other option. Thus, full feedback was available for all
options irrespective of the choice they made. The decisions-
from-feedback condition was identical to the decisions-to-
engage condition except the observe option was labeled “0
pts. with certainty”. Thus, in the decisions-to-engage condi-
tion, selecting the sure zero option was framed as taking an
inactive/passive role, while in the decisions-from-feedback
it was framed as an active choice of receiving nothing.
In both studies, irrespective of condition, outcomes re-
mained on the screen until a participant made the next de-
cision; decisions for a given choice set concluded after 100
decisions; participants encountered all choice sets in random
order; and participants were told when they had finished
their choices for each choice set and that a new set of choices
would follow. Participants were under no time constraints
when making their decisions.
As indicated in Table 1 some (non-zero) choice sets con-
sisted of only gains (positive outcomes), while others con-
sisted of both gains and losses (mixed outcomes). In half of
the mixed outcome sets, all options had positive EVs (+EV;
i.e., consequential choice led to gains on average), while, in
the other half of the mixed outcome sets, all non-zero op-
tions had negative EVs (–EV: i.e., consequential choice led
to losses on average). Study 1 used one gain only, one mixed
+EV, and one mixed –EV option-set while Study 2 included
two of each. All sets included an EV maximizing option:
The safer option was always better in Study 1 while the safer
and riskier options were better with equal frequency across
sets in Study 2. Options were randomly assigned to buttons
(labels) at the start of each task.
Both studies were conducted on Amazon Mechanical
Turk. Study 1 preceded another study and lasted 20 min-
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Table 1: Sets of non-zero options and their outcomes (O1 & O2) in points, probabilities (P1 & P2), and expected values (EV1
& EV2). Points were converted at a rate of 30 points to a $0.01. The first column indicates which sets were used in each
study.
Option 1 Option 2
Study Set type O11 P11 O12 P12 EV1 O21 P21 O22 P22 EV2
1 & 2 Gain only 53 0.33 27 0.67 36 75 0.33 9 0.67 31
1 & 2 Mixed +EV 53 0.33 −13 0.67 9 75 0.33 −31 0.67 4
1 & 2 Mixed –EV 28 0.33 −53 0.67 −26 50 0.33 −71 0.67 −31
2 Gain only 43 0.4 28 0.6 34 85 0.4 8 0.6 39
2 Mixed +EV 43 0.4 −12 0.6 10 85 0.4 −32 0.6 15
2 Mixed –EV 18 0.4 −0.52 0.6 −24 6 0.4 −72 0.6 −19
Figure 1: Screenshot of decisions-to-engage paradigm in Study 1. In the decisions-from-feedback condition, “Observe” was
replaced with “0 pts for sure”. In Study 2 the “Option” labels were replaced with each option’s outcome and its probability.
utes on average while Study 2 was run alone and lasted 30
minutes on average. To ensure that participants took their
decisions seriously all consequential decisions a participant
made were realized.
2.1 Participants
Table 2 shows the participant characteristics across studies;
we aimed for 100 participants per condition in Study 1, while
Study 2’s sample size was based on a power analysis aiming
to provide high power (1 − β = .90) to detect the difference
in choice proportions between the decisions-from-feedback
and decisions-to-engage conditions in the mixed negative
EV pair, based on the difference observed in Study 1.
3 Results of Study 1
Figure 2 (top) displays the proportion of participants choos-
ing with consequence from the gain-only option pair (left
panel) and the mixed-outcome option sets providing positive
(+EV; middle panel) and negative EVs (–EV; right panel),
plotted separately by condition (decisions-from-feedback,
DF; decisions-to-engage, Engage).
We compared the rate of consequential choice (choices in
each pair averaged by participant) in the decision-to-engage
condition to the rate of not choosing the certain zero option
in the decision-from-feedback condition using independent
t-tests. We found that in the gain-only pair those in the
decisions-to-engage condition (95%; CI95%[.93, .98]) did not
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Table 2: Participant details and pay.
Study N N Decisions-from-Experience N Decisions-to-Engage % male Mage Pay received
1 207 103 104 50% 34.4 $0.75 + choice-contingent pay (∼$1)
2 231 121 110 47% 36.2 $1.50 + choice-contingent pay (∼$2)
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Figure 2: Proportion of participants making consequential
choices in Study 1 (top) and Study 2 (bottom): for options
with positive outcomes only (left panel); options with mixed
outcomes with a positive EV (+EV; middle panel); and options
with mixed outcomes with a negative EV (–EV; right panel);
by condition: decisions-from-feedback (DF) and decisions-
to-engage (Engage). Asterisks indicate that the rate of con-
sequential choice was greater than 50%. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals.
choose with consequence significantly less than those in the
decisions-from-feedback condition (97%; CI95%[.95, .99]),
t(205) = .83, p = .41. Nevertheless, in the mixed outcome
positive-EV option pair those in the decisions-to-engage
condition (66%; CI95%[.59, .72]) chose with consequence
more (maximized more) so than those in the decisions-from-
feedback condition (53%; CI95%[.47, .59]), t(205) =−2.89, p
= .004. Similarly, in the mixed outcome negative-EV option
pair those in the decision-to-engage (56%; CI95%[.49, .62])
condition chose with consequence more than those in the
decision-from-feedback condition (45%; CI95%[.39, .51]),
i.e., maximized EV less, t(205) = −2.49, p = .01.
Figure 3 displays the rate of not choosing the observe or
sure zero option (i.e., the rate of consequential choice) over
decisions separately for each option-pair and condition. It
appears to reflect a decreasing in consequential choice in
the decisions-to-engage condition over time in the mixed
sets.4 For the final 25 decisions, the decisions-to-engage
and decisions-from-feedback conditions did not differ in the
gain-only pair, t(205) = .94, p = .35. However, in the mixed
positive (t(205) = −2.63, p = .009) and negative EV sets
(t(205) = −3.02, p = .003) the rate of consequential choice
was higher in the decisions-to-engage condition than in the
decisions-from-feedback condition (i.e., experience did not
eliminate the effect of frame).
4 Study 2
4.1 Changes to Method
Study 2 was designed to address two shortcomings of Study
1 and to examine a potential boundary for the observed fram-
ing effect. First, due to a programming oversight, foregone
outcomes were not recorded in Study 1, precluding poten-
tially informative model fitting. Second, in Study 1 the EV
maximizing option was always the safer option. Therefore,
in Study 2 three new sets of options were added (one gain
only, one mixed +EV, and one mixed –EV) in which the
riskier option provided the highest average payout (see Ta-
ble 1). Study 2 also added descriptive information about
each option. Specifically, instead of the options being la-
beled “Option A” or “Option B” they were labeled with their
possible outcomes and the probabilities of those outcomes
occurring. Thus, Study 2 allows us to examine whether the
effect of framing persists when full information is available:
We might, for instance, predict that if participants are ex-
plicitly aware that the likelihood and size of a loss occurring
is greater than that of a gain they would show a stronger
preference for the sure zero option.
4For additional analyses see the supplementary analysis.
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 12, No. 6, November 2017 To choose or not to choose 557
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Gains Only
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Mixed +EV
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Mixed −EV
R
at
e 
of
 C
on
se
qu
en
tia
l C
ho
ice
Decision Number
Decisions−from−Feedback      Decisions−to−Engage
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Gains Only
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Mixed +EV
0
.
25
.
5
.
75
1
0 20 40 60 80 100
Mixed −EV
R
at
e 
of
 C
on
se
qu
en
tia
l C
ho
ice
Decision Number
Decisions−from−Feedback       Decisions−to−Engage
Figure 3: The rate of consequential choice over decisions
in Study 1 (top) and Study 2 (bottom), plotted separately for
sets containing gains only (Gains Only), mixed outcomes with
a positive EV (Mixed +EV), and mixed outcomes with a neg-
ative EV (Mixed –EV), and by condition (black = decisions-
from-feedback; red = decisions-to-engage).
4.2 Results
Figure 2 (bottom) displays the proportion of participants
choosing with consequence from the gain only choice sets
(left panel) and the mixed outcome choice sets provid-
ing positive (+EV; middle panel) and negative EVs (–EV;
right panel), plotted separately by condition (decisions-from-
feedback – DF; decisions-to-engage – Engage).
As in Study 1 we compared the rate of consequential
choice (choices in each pair type averaged by participant) in
the decision-to-engage condition to the rate of not choosing
the sure zero option in the standard decision-from-feedback
condition. Counter to Study 1 we found that in the gain
only choice sets those in the decisions-to-engage condition
(97%; CI95%[.96, .99]) chose with consequence slightly, but
significantly, less than those in the decisions-from-feedback
condition (99%; CI95%[.99, .99]), t(229) = 2.88, p = .004.
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Figure 4: The number of participants estimated as having
a given λ (Lambda) by condition: decisions-from-feedback
(DF) and decisions-to-engage (Engage).
Those in the decisions-to-engage condition (77%; CI95%[.72,
.82]) chose with consequence marginally more than those
in the decisions-from-feedback condition (71%; CI95%[.65,
.76]) in the mixed outcome positive EV choice sets (i.e.,
maximized EVmore), t(229) =−1.81, p = .07. As in Study 1,
those in the decision-to-engage condition (60%; CI95%[.54,
.67]) also chose with consequence more than those in the
decision-from-feedback condition (51%; CI95%[.45, .56]) in
the mixed outcome negative EV choice sets (i.e., maximized
EV less), t(229) = −2.19, p = .03.
Figure 3 shows the rate of not choosing the observe or
sure zero option (i.e., the rate of consequential choice) over
decisions separately for each choice set and condition and
appears to show a stronger decline in consequential choice
in the mixed sets with experience than observed in Study 1.
Focusing on the final 25 decisions between the decisions-
to-engage and decisions-from-feedback conditions no dif-
ferences in significance from those reported above were
found for the gain only and mixed outcome positive EV sets.
The greater rate of consequential choice in the decisions-to-
engage condition was, however, no longer significant in the
mixed negative EV choice sets, t(229) = −1.50, p = .13.
Because information about the outcomes and their prob-
abilities of occurrence were provided, the first choice in
each pair was roughly equivalent to a decision in a descrip-
tive choice format without feedback. We therefore analyzed
whether there was any difference in the rate of consequential
choice between the two conditions for these first choices in
each set type. No significant differences were found (ts <
1.48, ps > .14).
While the results reported above may suggest that partici-
pants were less sensitive to losses in the decisions-to-engage
condition, another way to measure aversion to losses is to
employ computational modeling to determine how losses
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are weighted in the decision process. We accomplished
this by employing a standard reinforcement learning model
including a loss aversion parameter (λ) which estimates the
weighting of losses in the decision process (Ahn, Busemeyer,
Wagenmakers & Stout, 2008; see the supplementary analysis
in the Appendix for details regarding the model and model
fitting). The model was run for the conditions with mixed
gains and losses – estimating loss aversion in gain only prob-
lems does not make sense. In these conditions if λ is greater
than 1 this indicates that losses were weighted more heavily
than gains— in line with loss aversion. However, if λ equals
1 this indicates losses and gains wereweighted equally, while
λ < 1 indicates that losses were weighted less than gains (i.e.,
the opposite of loss aversion). Figure 4 shows a histogram
of these λ by condition. We find that the median value of
λ in the standard decisions from experience condition was
.88 whereas in the decisions to engage condition it reduced
to .52 (Mann-Whitney Z = 3.12, p = .002), suggesting that
participants treated losses as if they were less consequential
in the decision-to-engage condition. It is notable that theme-
dian participant (in either condition) appears to weigh losses
less heavily than gains; this is an unusual state of affairs in
decision research studies (i.e., losses do not loom larger than
gains in our data).
5 Discussion
We aimed to determine whether framing a decision as one
of taking an active or passive role would increase the rate of
selecting sure zero options, even when those options return
losses on average. We find that framing the decision as a
decision of whether or not to observe increased consequen-
tial choice: Participants chose with consequence frommixed
outcome options when they provided both positive and neg-
ative EVs more than they did in the decisions-from-feedback
paradigm and either equal to or greater than chance. While
this increase in consequential choice decreased participants’
earnings when options returned net losses on average (i.e.,
in the mixed outcome negative EV option sets), it increased
them when options returned net gains on average (i.e., in the
mixed outcome positive EV option sets). In addition, mod-
eling of participants’ decisions suggests that for most partic-
ipants loss aversion was reversed in both conditions, though
to a greater extent in the decision-to-engage paradigm. It
seems that when decisions are framed as a decision to opt
in or out of taking action participants are less avoidant of
potential losses, even when doing so puts them in harm’s
way.
These findings add to the literature on loss aversion (the
notion that, typically, “losses loom larger than gains”; Kah-
neman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). One
logical consequence of loss aversion is that a sure outcome
of zero is preferred to a mixed gamble with an EV of zero
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): This is implied by the steeper
relation between outcomes and subjective value for losses
compared to gains in the prospect theory value function. In-
deed, Tversky and Kahneman (1992) reported that, for the
median participant, a mixed outcome positive EV gamble
(50/50 gamble between +$202 or –$100) was indicated as
being as attractive as a sure outcome of $0. Yet, in our stud-
ies, a substantial proportion of participants chose a mixed
option with a worse-than-zero EV over a sure zero option
even with substantial experience (Studies 1 & 2) and com-
plete knowledge of the outcomes and probabilities (Study 2).
Such choices appear counter to loss aversion because a loss
averse decision maker would take the sure zero rather than
face the risk of losing money (nearly twice as much as they
couldwin in the negative-EV choice sets in Study 1 and some
in Study 2)5. Importantly, this adverse tendency is greatest
when the decision is framed as a decision-to-engage; thereby
adding to the growing literature which shows that sensitiv-
ity to losses is in many ways context dependent (e.g., see
Yechiam & Hochman, 2013; Walasek & Stewart, 2015).
It is also possible that framing the decisions as a decision-
to-engage decreased risk avoidance. In other words, par-
ticipants might not (only) have underestimated the impact
of a loss on their total earnings, but (additionally or alter-
natively) might have misjudged their relative frequency of
occurrence (even when description was provided in Study
2) which would also increase the attractiveness of choosing
from the options with consequence, or might simply found
the idea of risk taking to be fun. However, if diminished risk
aversion of these sorts was the main contributor to the effect,
we would also expect to see the rate of playing with con-
sequence to be greater in the decisions-to-engage paradigm
than the decisions-from-feedback paradigm in the gain only
choice sets as well. This pattern was not observed, and was
in fact reversed in Study 2 (although, in both studies, choice
with consequences was very close to ceiling). Thus, future
studies of this decision-to-engage effect would be wise to se-
lect sets of options designed to specifically test how changes
in risk sensitivity might contribute to the effect.
One explanation for the current results that fits irrespec-
tive of the root cause (decreased loss aversion/avoidance
and/or risk avoidance), and can also explain why EV max-
5Note, however, that when we say that these choices are not loss averse,
this should not be misunderstood as implying that participants are insen-
sitive to the presence of losses. Indeed, we find that the proportion of
consequential choices is lower for those choice sets in which losses oc-
cur (and in which the consequential choices therefore have lower EVs).
Thus participants are sensitive to EV and to the presence of losses, but
are arguably insufficiently sensitive to these features: for +EV sets they
sometimes make too few consequential choices to maximize EV, while for
–EV sets they often make too many consequential choices to maximize EV.
Thus in keeping with Peterson and Beach’s (1967) summary of research
comparing human decisions against normative models, we observe another
instance for which decision makers are “influenced by appropriate variables
and in appropriate directions . . . [while] the degree of sensitivity is often
less than optimal” (p. 43).
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 12, No. 6, November 2017 To choose or not to choose 559
imization is often observed in decisions-from-feedback, is
that in the decision-to-engage paradigm participants devel-
oped a myopic focus on the differences in payouts between
the two options (Vlaev, Chater, Stewart & Brown, 2011;
Stewart, Chater & Brown 2006), rather than the “bigger pic-
ture” of the average outcomes actually paid out (Kahneman
& Lovallo, 1993; Hills & Hertwig, 2010). Thus, explic-
itly presenting the options as a two-stage process (a choice
to engage, and – if engaging – a choice between options)
may mean that decision makers are less likely to compare all
options simultaneously. Specifically, participants may have
counted the option of not participating as disadvantageous
(Wilson et al., 2014). Therefore, consistent with a heuristic
such as “you have to be in it to win it”, the mere possibility of
gaining something was more rewarding than doing nothing
at all, while the size of gains and losses and their frequencies
of occurrence played a lesser part in this decision (Wells
& Windschitl, 1999; Reyna & Brainerd, 2008). Potentially,
this myopic focus emerged in the current setting because par-
ticipants perceived opting out as losing their agency, which
research suggests individuals are averse to (Paternoster &
Pogarsky, 2009). This explanation speaks to the seductive
‘grasp’ of the casino, on-line bookmaker, or ‘betting shop’.
Once the bettor is drawn into the gambling environment
(e.g., by ‘free’ bets, cheap entertainment or cost-effective
meals) the choices then encountered there (framed as opt-in
decisions) will be more attractive than the equivalent choice
encountered in a different context.
Another interesting finding observed in the present stud-
ies is that the rate of observational choice increased when
losses were possible compared to when they were not: The
EVs were also smaller in the mixed outcome sets and out-
comes varied more both of which may have played a role.
This result seems to be consistent with recent findings in the
decisions-from-samples paradigm that participants search
more before making a consequential choice if losses are pos-
sible (Lejarraga et al., 2012; Lejarraga & Hertwig, 2016;
see also Yechiam, Zahavi & Arditi, 2015). More generally,
it is consistent with the notion of loss attention (Yechiam &
Hochman, 2013), suggesting that losses lead to increased
vigilance and scrutiny of the environment. Importantly,
though, the current findings indicate that this effect of losses
on observational choices was not strong enough to counter-
act individuals’ tendency to engage in consequential choices
that included more frequent losses despite their disadvanta-
geousness.
Our results might seem inconsistent with the “loss at-
tention” account (Yechiam & Hochman, 2013) which pre-
dicts increased EVmaximization in tasks involving potential
losses. Our results show a robust violation of EV maximiza-
tion both when EVs were positive (choosing without conse-
quence) and negative (choosing with consequence). How-
ever, our study did not directly compare EV maximization
levels in the different domains, since problems presented in
each domain were different in terms of whether the status
quo option (observe or 0 option) was advantageous or not (in
the gain domain or loss domain, respectively).
A shortcoming of the current work, and of most research
exploring decisions-from-experience in the lab, is that de-
cisions outside of the lab rarely happen back to back in a
rapid fashion. Similarly, apart from playing state lotteries,
casino games, and some forms of investment (and reinvest-
ment), few decisions involve repeated choices from options
providing monetary outcomes with fixed probabilities. We
would thus urge caution in inferring the generalizability of
the current findings to real-world behaviors where decisions
are more complex. Nonetheless, our finding that framing
a sure zero option as an opt-out option can increase risk-
taking (while, conversely, framing an opt-out option as “tak-
ing zero” can decrease risk taking) is potentially important.
For example, it may speak to the seduction of inducements
to gambles that explicitly focus on what may be missed out
on by electing not to gamble, and the policy or regulatory
decisions about how casinos and bookmakers may advertise
their “services”. And there are many situations in which
evaluations of products, opportunities, people or situations
are based on experiences or observations that are in fact
made in rapid succession. Thus, one may consider multi-
ple views of an item, several online reviews of a hotel, or
size up a new acquaintance or location based on multiple
observations – all acquired in just a few seconds. Moreover,
such evaluations are tied to decisions: once observations
or experiences have accumulated, one can walk away from
the potential purchase, book the hotel, close the door on the
salesman, or flee the dark foreboding street. What we learn
from laboratory choices that require rapid evaluation of ob-
servations may inform our understanding of such situations
(e.g., whether “first impressions” weigh heavily in the eval-
uation and the decision that follows; Ashby & Rakow, 2016;
Denrell, 2005).
In sum, the current results provide some insight into the
role that experience and choice architecture play in decisions-
from-experience. We find that when decisions are framed
as a decision to engage or not many decision makers choose
to play with consequence irrespective of the possibility and
size of potential losses and gains. This increase in conse-
quential choice can be both helpful and harmful depending
upon the option payoffs, and therefore provides an important
boundary condition for when experience might aid decision
makers and when it might lead to self-harm. More generally,
our studies point to a gap in the literature. JDM researchers
“know” the typical pattern of risk preference under differ-
ent conditions (e.g., the “four-fold pattern” summarized in
textbooks), because there have been hundreds of carefully
conducted studies of risky choice. However, almost all of
these studies employed forced choice paradigms. Our stud-
ies illustrate that the patterns of preference may not look
the same when decision makers can choose not to choose
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and garner some experience (e.g., the fourfold pattern has
been shown to be reversed in experiential choice; Hertwig &
Erev, 2009). Researching such decisions will give us a fuller
understanding of how preferences play out in the decisions
where “opting out” is an option.
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Appendix: Supplementary Analysis
Study 1
To explore what influenced participants to choose a higher
value option when they did choose with consequence (did
not choose the sure zero option), we performed a logistic
regression predicting a choice of the higher value option by
condition, choice set type (entered linearly and centered),
and their interaction. We controlled for repeated measure-
ment by clustering on the level of participant (Rogers, 1991).
Only choice set type was significant with the rate of picking
the higher value option being lower when losses were large
(MGains = .68; MMixed +EV = .53; MMixed –EV = .44), Odds
Ratio = .59, z = −6.68, p < .001. Other ps > .15.
Study 2.
To explore what influenced participants to choose a higher
value option when they did choose with consequence (did
not choose the sure zero option), we performed a logistic
regression predicting a choice of the higher value option
by condition, gamble type (entered linearly and centered),
whether the riskier option was of higher value, as well as
their respective interactions. We controlled for repeated
measurement by clustering on the level of participant. We
find that the likelihood of picking the higher EV option was
lower as the overall value of the options decreased (i.e., going
from the gain only to themixed negativeEVpair), OddsRatio
= .66, z=5.19, p< .001, and increasedwhen the riskier option
was of higher value, Odds Ratio = 1.29, z = 2.12, p = .03.
These effects are qualified by their interaction indicating that
participants tended to prefer the riskier options when losses
were larger (Riskier worse: MGains = .64; MMixed +EV = .54;
MMixed –EV = .59; Riskier Better: MGains = .61; MMixed +EV
= .46; MMixed –EV = .72), a preference which was rewarding
when the riskier was better, but costly when it was not, Odds
Ratio = 2.55, z = 7.23, p < .001. Lastly, we find that those
in decisions-to-engage condition (M = .63; CI95% [.59, .66])
made more choices for the higher value options than those
in the decisions-from-feedback (M = .57; CI95% [.55, .59])
condition, Odds Ratio = 1.26, z = 2.01, p = .04. None of the
other interactions reached significance, ps > .07.
Ahn et al. (2008)’s learning model.
This model is based on prospect theory’s value function
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) in that:
i f x(t) > 0 : u(t) = x(t)γ
i f x(t) < 0 : u(t) = −λ |x(t) |γ
where u(t) is the utility for outcome x in trial t; λ is the loss
aversion parameter, which was constrained between 0 and
10; and γ is the diminishing sensitivity parameter, whichwas
constrained between 0 and 1. Themodel further assumes that
the participants learn from experience using a delta learning
rule, as follows:
Ej (t) = Ej (t−1) + φ[v(t) − Ej (t−1)]
where Ej is the expectancy (or propensity) of each option
j, and φ is the learning rate parameter (validation of this
learning assumption appears in Ahn et al., 2008).6 Choices
are a stochastic function of the expectancies, as follows:
Pr[G j, (t + 1)] =
eφEj (t )
∑
k e
φEk (t )
6The differences in λ between study conditions are replicated when
using alternative learning assumption (e.g., a decay based learning model;
Ahn et al., 2008).
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Supplementary Table 1: Median model fit (BIC) and parameter values in the two study conditions for the problems involving
mixed gains and losses in Study 2. Standard errors appear in parenthesis.
Condition Model fit (BIC) Diminishing sensitivity (γ) Loss aversion (λ) Recency (φ) Sensitivity (c)
Decisions-from-Feedback 36.19 (23.0) 0.61 (.04) .88 (.34) .03 (.04) .58 (.38)
Decision-to-Engage 34.01 (18.1) 0.45 (.04) .52 (.28) .02 (.03) .91 (.40)
where Pr[G j, (t)] is the probability of selecting option G
in trial t, and θ determines whether one is making more or
less deterministic choices (i.e., whether the predicted choice
proportion is determined according to the expectancies). As
in Ahn et al. (2008) and Yechiam and Ert (2007), θ = 3c,
and the range of parameter c was constrained between 0 and
10 (higher values of c imply greater determinism).
The fit of the model to the current two datasets was com-
pared to a simple baseline model based on the optimized pro-
portion of the choices of the different options: The baseline
model prediction is the mean probability of selecting each
alternative. A BIC test (Schwartz, 1978) was used to com-
pare the baseline to the learning model, as follows: BIC =
2[Log Likelihood Model − Log Likelihood Baseline]− k · ln(t),
where k is the difference in the number of parameters be-
tween the learning model and baseline model (i.e., k = 2).
Modeling took place as in Ahn et al. (2007). The results
showed that model fits were adequate (mean BIC of 99.14,
median of 22.13). Because the mean of the parameter esti-
mates for λ is biased for loss aversion (e.g., mean of λ = 2
and λ = 0.5 is 1.25 despite the fact that the two estimates
are equally loss averse and gain seeking), we used median
parameters, as shown in Supplementary Table 1.
